By Evan Osnos
In my fifth year in Beijing, I moved into a one-story brick
house beside the Confucius Temple, a seven-hundred-year-old shrine to China’s
most important philosopher. The temple, which shared a wall with my kitchen,
was silent. It had gnarled cypress trees and a wooden pavilion that loomed
above my roof like a conscience. In the mornings, I took a cup of coffee
outside and listened to the wakeup sounds next door: the brush of a broom
across the flagstones, the squeak of a faucet, the hectoring of the magpies
overhead.
It was a small miracle that the shrine had survived.
Confucius, who was born in the sixth century B.C., traditionally had a stature
in China akin to that of Socrates in the West. He stressed compassion, ritual,
and duty. “There is government when the prince is prince, and the minister is
minister; when the father is father, and the son is son,” Confucius said.
Chairman Mao believed in “permanent revolution,” and when the Cultural
Revolution began, in 1966, he exhorted young Red Guards to “Smash the Four
Olds”: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. Zealots denounced
Confucius for fostering “bad elements, rightists, monsters, and freaks,” and
one of Mao’s lieutenants gave the approval to dig up his grave.
Hundreds of temples were destroyed. By the
nineteen-eighties, Confucianism was so maligned that the historian Yu Ying-shih
called it a “wandering soul.”
In September, 2010, nine months after I moved in, I was at
my desk one morning when I heard a loudspeaker crackle to life inside the
temple. A booming voice was followed by the sound of a heavy bell, then drums
and a flute, and the recitation of passages from writings by Confucius and
other ancient masters. The performance lasted twenty minutes. An hour later, it
was repeated, and an hour after that, and again the next day.
The wandering soul, in one form or another, has been
stirring. As China undergoes an economic transformation ten times the speed of
the first industrial revolution, people are turning to ancient ideas for a
connection to the past. The classics have become such reliable bestsellers
that, in 2009, the company behind National Studies Web, a site that sells
digitized Confucian texts, went public on the Shenzhen stock exchange. To
appeal to entrepreneurs, Peking University and other respected schools created
mid-career courses that promised to reveal “commercial wisdom” in the classics.
Confucianism has no priesthood or rites of conversion, and
is not generally considered a religion, but new members of China’s middle class
regard an interest in philosophy and history as a mark of cultivation and
cultural nationalism. Parents have enrolled their children at private Confucian
academies; I visited a weekend school where children aged three to thirteen
were learning the classics by rote, reciting each passage six hundred times.
Around the country, Chinese tourists flocked to the surviving Confucius
Temples, where they filled out prayer cards. “The overwhelming number are about
exams,” Anna Sun, a sociologist at Kenyon College, who studied the cards, told
me. “They are primarily wishes for the college entrance exam, but also the
TOEFL, the G.R.E., law school.”
It would have been anathema to Chairman Mao, but his heirs
have changed their view on revolution. In the eighties, when China set itself
in pursuit of prosperity, the Party studied how Confucian values had helped to
stabilize other countries in East Asia. Generations of Chinese thinkers had
dreamed of finding the optimal recipe for “national studies”—the mixture of
philosophy and history that might insulate China from the pressures of
Westernization. After the democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989
ended in a violent crackdown, leaders needed an indigenous ideology that might
restore the Party’s moral credibility. Top Communists gave speeches at meetings
devoted to Confucianism, and state television launched a series about
traditional culture intended, it said, “to boost the people’s self-confidence,
self-respect, and patriotic thought.” In 2002, the Party officially stopped
calling itself a “revolutionary party” and adopted the term “Party in Power.”
The Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, declared, “Unity and stability are really more
important than anything else.” In February, 2005, the Party chief, Hu Jintao,
quoted Confucius’ observation that “harmony is something to be cherished.”
Soon, “harmony” was on billboards and in television
commercials and intoned by apparatchiks. In 2006, a team of government-backed
historians marked Confucius’ 2,557th birthday by unveiling what they called a
“standardized” portrait: a kindly old figure with a luxuriant beard, his hands
crossed at his chest. The Chinese Association for the Study of Confucius,
supported by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, introduced traditions that had
never existed before. It arranged for couples to renew their wedding vows in
front of a statue of the sage.
As a gender alternative to Mao, Confucius has been enlisted
as an avatar on the world stage. The opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympics made
no mention of the Chairman but featured recurring references to harmony and to
the classic texts. In the past decade, China has opened more than four hundred
Confucius Institutes around the world to teach language, culture, and history.
Many universities have welcomed them; the program provides teaching materials
and cash. (Some scholars have complained that the institutes seek to limit
expression. In July, McMaster University, in Canada, closed its Confucius
Institute after a teacher complained that she had been prevented from
practicing Falun Gong, the banned spiritual movement.)
The Confucian revival has been especially visible in the
city of Qufu, the sage’s home town, in present-day Shandong Province. In 2007,
the city’s International Confucius Festival was cosponsored by the Confucius
Wine Company. Thousands of people filled a local stadium, giant balloons
bearing the names of ancient scholars bobbed overhead, and a Korean pop star
performed in an abbreviated outfit. Near the cave where Confucius was said to
have been born, a five-hundred-million-dollar museum-and-park complex is under
construction; it includes a statue of Confucius that is nearly as tall as the
Statue of Liberty. In its marketing, Qufu has adopted comparisons to Jerusalem and
Mecca and calls itself “The Holy City of the Orient.” Last year, it received
4.4 million visitors, surpassing the number of people who visited Israel.
No one has harnessed the interest in Confucius more
successfully than Yu Dan, a professor of media studies at Beijing Normal
University. She presented a popular series of lectures on state television and
wrote a book, “Confucius from the Heart” (2006), that is said to have sold ten
million copies. Today, she occupies a position in Chinese pop culture somewhere
between Bernard-Henri Levy and Dr. Phil. She plays down themes that irritate
modern readers-—such as Confucius’ observation that “women and small people are
hard to deal with”—and writes, reassuringly, “The truths that Confucius gives
us are always the easiest of truths.” Scholars mock her work—one critic
attended book signings in a T-shirt that read “Confucius is deeply worried”—
but within a year Yu became the sec-ond-highest-paid author in China, after Guo
Jingming, a writer of young-adult fiction who travelled with guards to hold
back the crowds.
At Yu Dan’s headquarters in Beijing, a suite of offices on a
high floor at the edge of the campus, her assistant ushered me into a modern
conference room. Yu Dan arrived, smiling broadly, and asked the assistant to
prepare tea. Yu Dan, who is in her late forties, has high cheekbones and a
short, severe haircut. I asked what prompted her to embrace the classics. She
said that, like others her age, she had grown up denouncing the ancient
scriptures. “When I began writing ‘Confucius from the Heart,’ a lot of people
asked me, Why are you writing this?’ And I said, ‘I am atoning for the crimes
of my generation, because we were young and we criticized him mercilessly.’ ”
She paused, and turned her attention to the assistant, a
graduate student. “Child, how could you be so stupid!” Yu said. “This tea has
been steeping for too long!” She looked at me, and the smile returned.
“Children today do not know how to host people,” she said. After Yu became
popular, the Party invited her to conferences, and she began presenting her
readings of the classics in a political context. “Unlimited possibility leads
to chaos, because you don’t know where to go or what to do,” she told me,
adding, “We must rely on a strict system to resolve problems. As citizens, our
duty is not necessarily to be perfect moral persons. Our duty is to be
law-abiding citizens.”
Confucius—or Kongzi, which means Master Kong—was not born to
power, but his idiosyncrasies and ideas made him the Zelig of the Chinese
classics. His story runs through the ancient books—the Analects, Zuo-zhuan,
Mengzi, the Records of the Grand Historian—with details that range from
historical to mythical. His father, Shuliang He, was an aging
warrior—physically enormous and famously ugly—who was desperate for a healthy
son. When he was in his seventies, he found a teen-age concubine, and they had
a son, in 551 B.C. The baby, like his father, was unsightly, with a crooked
nose and a bulbous forehead so peculiar that he was given the name Qiu, meaning
“mound.” (Admirers insisted that his head resembled a crown.)
When Confucius was three, his father died, and his mother
set off with her toddler to find a livelihood. As a boy, he worked and lost
himself in poetry and imagination. He married at eighteen or nineteen, but was
bored and frustrated, because he lacked the connections to realize his ambition
of becoming a bureaucrat. Instead, he offered to teach students of every social
class. It was an era of war and corruption, and Confucius argued that rituals
could teach people to reconcile their desires to the needs of family and
community. He was an optimist. A virtuous ruler, he said, is like the wind:
“The moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the wind blows,
the grass bends.” He finally earned a government post, but his reforms
threatened other officials, and, as legend has it, they concocted a plan to
drive him out: They sent his superior eighty beautiful girls, who succeeded in
occupying the boss so thoroughly (he disappeared for three days) that the
righteous Confucius had to leave. Humiliated, Confucius began travelling about
the country, pointing out abuses. He met a woman whose husband and son had been
eaten by tigers, and he told his disciples, “An oppressive government is more
terrible than tigers.” Confucius was so radical that a fellow-sage, Laozi (said
to be the founder of Taoism), warned him against “all this huffing and puffing,
as though you were carrying a big drum and searching for a lost child.” To
Confucius, harmony was consensus, not conformity. It required loyal opposition.
A country is at risk, he said, when a prince believes that “the only joy in
being a prince is that no one opposes what one says.” Warlords ignored him or
tried to kill him.
Confucius never imagined that he would become an icon. “He
liked conversations. They helped him think, but he never expected anyone to
write them down,” the historian Annping Chin observed, in “The Authentic
Confucius: A Life of Thought and Politics” (2007). “Confucius did not wish to
have his words end up as rules,” she wrote, because “he loved the idea of being
human. He loved the entirely private journey of finding what was right and
feasible among life’s many variables.”
After thirteen years of wandering, Confucius returned home
to his books, and he died, in his seventies, convinced that he was a failure.
Of his three thousand students, only seventy-two were true disciples, said to
have mastered his teachings, which they compiled in the Analects. His rules
made him exhausting to be around. ‘When the meat was not cut squarely, he would
not eat,” his disciples wrote. ‘When a thing was not accompanied by its proper
sauce, he would not eat.” But in times of war or instability his dictates on
how to dress, how to govern, and how to live held out the tantalizing promise
of order. A prime minister later remarked, ‘With just half the Analects, I can
govern the empire.”
In the centuries that followed, Confucianism was manipulated
and buffeted by politics. In 213 B.C., the first emperor of China sought to put
knowledge under government control and ordered the burning of books, including
Confucian texts. People who invoked them were executed or sentenced to labor in
exile. Confucianism was revived in the subsequent dynasty, the Han, and was
China’s state ideology for much of the next two millennia. The temple next to
my house in Beijing was built in 1306, near the Imperial Academy, a training
ground for officials, which remained China’s highest seat of learning until the
fall of the emperor, in 1911.
A few days after I heard the loudspeaker next door, a large
banner went up in our neighborhood, identifying the temple as “The Holy Land of
National Studies.” For the first time since the Communist Party came to power,
in 1949, the temple was putting on a celebration of Confucius’ birthday. The
occasion featured speeches by government officials and professors and a
recitation by children. I figured that the event would probably signal the end
of the daily musical shows, but in the weeks that followed they continued, and
followed a regular schedule: eveiy hour, ten to six, seven days a week, rain or
shine. The sound echoed off the walls of the houses beside the temple, and what
had begun as a novelty gradually wore grooves into the minds of my neighbors.
Huang Wenyi, an employee at a recycling yard, who lived next door, told me, “I
hear it in my head at night. It’s like I’ve been on a boat all day and I can
still feel the rocking.”
His face brightened with an idea. ‘You should go tell them
to turn down the volume.”
“Why me?”
“Because you’re a foreigner. They’ll pay attention to you.”
I wasn’t sure I wanted the kind of attention that comes from
complaining about China’s most famous philosopher. But I was curious about the
show and arranged to visit the head of the temple, a man named Wu Zhiyou. Wu
looked less like a theologian than like an actor who’d play the kindly father
in a Chinese soap opera: in his mid-fifties, he had a large, handsome face, a
perfect pair of dimples in his cheeks, and a resonant voice that sounded
somehow familiar. Before being posted to run the temple, he had spent most of
his career in the research office of the city’s Propaganda Department, and he
had a mind for marketing. Of the performance, he said, “This show has attracted
people from all levels of society—Chinese and foreigners, men and women, well
educated and less educated, experts and ordinary people.”
I asked if he was involved in the production. “I’m the chief
designer!” he said, eyes shining. “I oversaw every detail. Even the narrator’s
voice is mine.” The show had been conceived under demanding circumstances. Wu
had been given only a month’s notice before the birthday celebration. He hired
a composer, recruited dancers from a local art school, and selected lines from
the classics that could lend the performance a narrative shape. “You need ups
and downs and a climax, just like a movie or a play,” he said. “If it’s too
bland, it will never work.”
Wu had succeeded in making the Confucius Temple into his own
community theatre, and he was savoring his role. “In junior middle school, I
was always the student leader of the propaganda section of the student
council,” he said. “I love reading aloud, and music and art.” In his spare
time, he still did cross-talk comedy routines, the Chinese version of standup.
He had plans for the temple’s future. “We’re building a new set that will have
ceramic statues of the seventy-two disciples. And we need more lighting. Then,
maybe, I can say it is complete.” '
Wu checked his watch. He wanted me to catch the
three-o’clock show. He gave me a book on the history of the temple and said,
“After you read this book, your questions will no longer be questions.”
The stage, in front of a pavilion on the north side of the compound,
had been fitted with lights. The cast consisted of sixteen young men and women
in scholars’ robes; each song-and-dance routine was named for a line from the
classics—the Analects, the Book of Songs, the Book of Rites, and others— and
had an upbeat interpretation: “Happiness” was based on the line “Good fortune
lies within bad; bad fortune lies within good.” (The stage version omitted the
ominous second clause.) The finale, “Harmony,” linked Confucius and the
Communist Party. A pamphlet explained that it conveyed the “harmonious ideology
and harmonious society of the ancient people, which will have a positive
influence on the construction of modern harmonious society.”
I read the book that Wu gave me, and the depth of detail
about ancient events was impressive: it recorded who planted which trees on the
temple grounds seven hundred years ago. But it was conspicuously silent on
other matters, including the years between 1905 and 1981. In the official
history of the Confucius Temple, most of the twentieth century was blank.
During my time in China, I had learned to expect that
renderings of history came with holes, like the dropouts in an audio recording
when the music goes silent and resumes as if nothing had happened. Some of
those edits were ordained from above: for years the people were barred from
discussing the crackdown at Tiananmen Square or the famine of the Great Leap
Forward, which took between thirty million and forty-five million lives,
because the Party had never repudiated or accepted responsibility for those
events. Ordinary Chinese had few choices: some accepted the forgetting, because
they were poor and determined to get on with their lives; some raged against
it, but lacked the political means to resist.
There were other books about the Confucius Temple, and these
filled in the blanks—especially about the night of August 23,1966, during the
opening weeks of the Cultural Revolution. The order to “Smash the Four Olds”
had devolved into a chaotic assault on authority of all kinds. That afternoon,
a group of Red Guards summoned one of China’s most famous writers, Lao She, to
the temple’s front gate.
Lao She was sixty-seven and one of China’s best hopes for
the Nobel Prize in Literature. He had grown up not far from the temple, in
poverty, the son of an imperial guard who died in battle against foreign
armies. In 1924, he went to London and stayed for five years, living near
Bloomsbury and reading Conrad and Joyce. He wore khakis because he couldn’t
afford tweeds. In 1936, he wrote “Rickshaw Boy,” about a young rickshaw puller
whose encounters with injustice turn him into a “degenerate, selfish, hapless
product of a sick society.” Lao She also lived in America, for more than three
years—on Manhattan’s Upper West Side—but he eventually returned to China and
became to Beijing what Victor Hugo was to Paris: the city’s quintessential
writer. The Party named him a “People’s Artist.” He resented being asked to
produce propaganda, but, like many, he was a loyal servant who poured criticism
on his fellow-writers when they fell out with the Party.
Now he was the target. A group of Red Guards—mostly
schoolgirls of fifteen and sixteen—pushed him through the gates of the temple
and forced him to kneel on the flagstones beside a bonfire, among other writers
and artists. His accusers denounced him for his ties to America and for
amassing dollars, a common accusation at the time.
They shouted “Down with the anti-Party elements!” and used
leather belts with heavy brass buckles to whip the old men and women. Lao She
was bleeding from the head, but he remained conscious. Three hours later, he
was taken to a police station, where his wife retrieved him.
The next morning, Lao She rose early and walked northwest
from his home to a pond called the Lake of Great Peace. He read poetry and
wrote until the sun set. Then he took off his shirt and draped it over a tree
branch, loaded his pockets with stones, and walked into the lake.
When the body was discovered the next day, his son, Shu Yi,
was summoned to collect it. The police had found his father’s clothes, his
cane, his glasses, and his pen, as well as a sheaf of papers that he had left
behind. The official ruling on his death declared that Lao She had “isolated
himself from the people.” He was a “counter-revolutionary” and was barred from
receiving a proper burial. The body was cremated without ceremony. His widow
and children put his spectacles and his pen into a casket and buried it.
I wondered about the son, Shu Yi. He would be in his
seventies now, older than his father was when he died. I asked around and
discovered that he lived only a few minutes’ walk from my house. He invited me
over. Shu Yi had white hair and a heavy, kind face, and his apartment was
cluttered with books and scrolls and paintings. As we talked, a soft breeze
blew in the window from a nearby canal. I asked if he had ever learned more
about his father’s suicide.
“It’s hard to know exactly, but I think his death was his
final act of struggle,” Shu Yi said. “Many years later, I came upon an article
called ‘Poets,’ which he had written in 1941”—a quarter century before he died.
“He wrote, ‘Poets are a strange crowd. When everyone else is happy, the poets
can say things that are discouraging. When everyone else is sorrowful, the
poets can laugh and dance. But when the nation is in danger they must drown
themselves and let their deaths be a warning in the name of truth.’ ”
This sacrifice was a tradition in China, dating to the third
century B.C., when the poet Qu Yuan drowned himself in protest against corruption.
Shu Yi told me, “By doing so, they are fighting back, telling others what the
truth really is.” His father, he said, “would rather break than bend.”
After I talked to Shu Yi, I went back to see Wu Zhiyou, the
head of the temple, and asked him about the story of Lao She’s final night. He
gave a short sigh and said, “It’s true. During the Cultural Revolution, there
were struggle sessions here. Afterward, Lao She went home and threw himself in
the lake. This can be described as a historical fact.”
Why had the temple’s written history made no mention of it?
Wu struggled to find an answer, and I braced myself for a
dose of propaganda. But then he said, “It’s too sad. It makes people too sad. I
think it’s best not to include this in books. It’s factual, it’s history, but
it was not because of the temple. It was because of the time. It doesn’t belong
in the records of the Confucius Temple.”
I understood his point, but the explanation felt incomplete.
Lao She was beaten in the temple because it was a place of learning, of ideas,
of history; the permission to attack one of China’s most famous novelists was,
like so much of the Cultural Revolution, the permission to attack what it meant
to be Chinese, and in the decades since then the Party and the people had never
reconciled all that they lost in those moments. Even if someone wanted to mark
the site where Beijing’s greatest chronicler ended his life, it would be
difficult; the Lake of Great Peace was filled in decades ago, during an
extension of the subway system. I have often marvelled at how much people in
China have managed to put behind them: revolution, war, poverty, and the
upheavals of the present. My neighbor Huang lived with his mother, who was
eighty-eight. When I once asked her if she had photos of her family, she said,
“They were burned during the Cultural Revolution.” And then she laughed—the
particular hollow laugh that the Chinese reserve for awful things.
The Cultural Revolution dismantled China’s ancient belief
systems, and the economic revolution that followed could not rebuild them.
Prosperity had yet to define the ultimate purpose of the nation and the
individual. There was a hole in Chinese life that people called the jingshen
kongxu—“the spiritual void.” Eveiy day, I noticed groups of civil servants from
the hinterlands and students from around the city visiting the Confucius
Temple. One young guide with a ponytail spoke to a group of mid-dle-aged
Chinese women. She held her hands out before her. “This is the gesture for
paying respects to Confucius,” she said. Her visitors did their best to copy
her. For many people in China, I realized, the gaps in histoiy had made
Confucius a stranger. It was difficult to know where his life ended and the
mythology and the politics began. Annping Chin wrote, “We give him credit for
all that has gone right and wrong in China because we do not really know him.”
In that vacuum, some in China have been eager to put the
philosopher to more useful political purposes. In October, 2010, the dissident
writer Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an eleven-year sentence for subversion, was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. That enraged the Chinese government. In
response, a group of nationalists organized what they called the “Confucius
Peace Prize,” and awarded it, the next year, to Vladimir Putin, for bringing
“safety and stability to Russia.” At times, the embrace of Confucius has turned
hostile. In December, 2010, a group of ten well-known classical scholars
denounced a plan to build a large Christian church in Qufu, Confucius’ home
town. “We beseech you to respect this sacred land of Chinese culture, and stop
the building of the Christian church at once,” they wrote. The government tried
to argue that there was a precedent for having a church in town, but the
protest attracted the support of grassroots Confucian associations and Web
sites, and construction was postponed.
In China, the official embrace of Confucius has come to be
seen by some as suffocating. When, in the name of protecting political
stability, censors remove critical comments from the Chinese Web, savvy users
say that their words have been “harmonized.” The Party’s conception of
Confucian harmony leaves little room for the politics of negotiation, for an
honest clash of ideas. After the pop scholar Yu Dan became a sensation, Li
Ling, a Peking University professor, published “Stray Dog: My Reading of the
Analects,” in which he criticized the “manufactured Confucius.” He wrote, “The
real Confucius, the one who actually lived, was neither a sage nor a king. ...
He had no power or status—only morality and learning—and dared to criticize the
power elite of his day. He travelled around lobbying for his policies, racking
his brains to help the rulers of his day with their problems, always trying to
convince them to give up evil ways and be more righteous.... He was tormented,
obsessed, and driven to roam, pleading for his ideas, more like a stray dog
than a sage.”
When Li’s book came out, in May, 2007, he was denounced by
other classical scholars, such as Jiang Qing, a prominent Confucian political
thinker, who called the author “a cynical doomsday prophet who deserves no
response.” One of Li’s defenders was Liu Xiaobo. Before Liu went to prison, he
warned of a mood in which “Confucianism was venerated and all other schools of
thought were banned.” Instead of invoking Confucius, Liu wrote, intellectuals
should be venerating “independence of thought and autonomy of person.”
The longer I lived beside the Confucius Temple the more I
sensed the gap between what people asked of it and what it provided. The
Chinese came to the temple, to the Holy Land of National Studies, on a quest
for some kind of moral continuity. But it rarely gave them what they wanted.
The Party, to maintain its hold over history, offered a caricature of Confucius.
Generations of Chinese had grown up condemning China’s ethical and
philosophical traditions, only to find that the Party was now abrupdy
resurrecting them, without granting permission to discuss what had happened in
the interim. Hu Shuli, a progressive editor, described a “collective amnesia”
surrounding the Cultural Revolution. “Files on that episode in our history
remain ‘secret,’ ” she wrote. “Older generations do not dare look back, while
our younger generations don’t have the remotest inkling of the Cultural
Revolution.”
There were signs that liberal intellectuals were not the
only ones losing patience with the official rendering of Confucius. In
November, 2012, Yu Dan appeared before an audience at Peking University after a
performance of Chinese opera, and the students booed her. They shouted that she
didn’t deserve to be onstage with serious scholars. “Get out of here!” someone
yelled, and Yu made a hasty exit. The previous winter, a large statue of
Confucius appeared beside Tiananmen Square, the first new addition to such a
sensitive spot since Mao’s mausoleum was erected, a generation ago.
Philosophers and political scientists wondered if it signalled an official
change to the Party platform. But then, four months after it arrived, the
statue disappeared. It was moved, in the middle of the night, to a much less
prominent site, in the courtyard of a museum. The reason for the move remained
a mysteiy, because the Central Propaganda Department barred Chinese journalists
from writing about it. People were left to joke that Confucius, the itinerant
teacher from Shandong Province, had been caught trying to live in Beijing
without the proper permit.
The New Yorker, 13 January 2014